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Dominant Ethnicity: From Minority to Majority
In global terms, we are in the midst of a long-term shift from dominant 
minority to dominant majority ethnicity. Indeed, this paper claims that a cardinal  
principle of the premodern order is minority domination (often by an ethnic minority)  
whereas that of the modern era is dominant majority ethnicity. Modernity, with its 
accent on democracy, popular sovereignty and the coincidence of culture and politics, 
renders the principle of minority ethnic dominance increasingly untenable. The most 
recent examples of this shift may be seen in the former Soviet Union (with the decline 
of Russian settler minorities), and now in Iraq and even Bolivia, where Evo Morales 
declared, in 2005, that 'for the first time, we [indigenous people rather than Spanish 
creole descendants] are the government'. ("Bolivia's Election Stunner" 2005) Looking 
ahead, one can spot the vulnerability in minority-dominated societies like Syria, 
Rwanda and Bahrain, not to mention the precarious economic dominance of Latin 
American and Caribbean whites, and diaspora Chinese, Lebanese and Indians. (Chua 
2002) At a time when regime change and democratisation form the centrepiece of 
American foreign policy, it is particularly germane to investigate how dominant 
minorities have gained and sustained their dominance over subordinate majorities, the 
nature of power shifts to ethnic majorities, and the way in which dominant ethnicity 
intersects with national identity.
Dominant Ethnicity
The explosion of research in ethnicity and nationalism studies in the last quarter 
century has systematically failed to comprehend dominant ethnic groups, except as 
political actors struggling for power within plural, mainly postcolonial, states. The 
ethnic identities of dominant groups and their relationship to the nation remains 
opaque because of the divide between studies of ethnicity (which only address 
dominant groups in the context of power relations) and scholarship on nationalism. 
Students of ethnicity, beginning with Robert Park's 'Chicago School' of urban 
sociology in the United States in the early 1920s, generally focused on ethnic groups 
as immigrant minorities. (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004) Meanwhile, writing on 
nationalism began from a statist tradition (i.e. Kohn 1944; Deutsch 1953; Cobban 
1969), with the foremost expositors of this genre being Europeans who took the post-
1789 European nation-state as their reference point. For these 'modernist' theorists of 
nationalism, the major phenomena to be explained were the nations that states created 
and the minority nations that arose on the peripheries of these states in opposition to 
the nation-building project of the state. (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 
1983) State-nations, anti-state nations and immigrant ethnic minorities thereby formed 
the building blocks of scholarship on ethnicity and nationalism. This in turn 
influenced political theory: Will Kymlicka's typology encompasses 'ethnocultural 
groups' (i.e. immigrant minorities), 'minority nations' (i.e. anti-state nations) and the 
national identity of the state (i.e. state nations). (Kymlicka 1995: 15; 1997: 59) This 
work has since become the reference point for the vast political theory literature on 
liberal nationalism and multiculturalism. Dominant ethnic groups remain, 
unfortunately, missing from this picture. 
The taproots of a literature on dominant ethnicity come from two major 
directions. The first scholarly tradition highlights the role of ethnic dominance within 
plural societies with ranked ethnic systems. (Geertz 1963; Smith 1969; Schermerhorn 
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1970; Young 1976; Horowitz 1985) Schermerhorn, for example, fleshed out a four-
way matrix which divided the world's ethnic groups into dominant and subaltern, 
minority or majority. This was an exclusively power-centred typology, but at least it 
acknowledged the reality that, first, ethnic groups could be majorities, and, second, 
dominant ethnic groups could exist as minorities. What remained lacking, however, 
was an understanding of the 'ethnicity' side of the dominant ethnicity equation, and 
how this related to the nation. This deeper, subjective realm of dominant ethnicity 
remained unprobed until Anthony Smith's landmark Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986). 
Here Smith introduced the concept of a 'core ethnie' whose premodern mytho-
symbolic resources, including myths of ancestry and homeland as well as a proper 
name, laid the basis for subsequent nation-states like France or Japan. Smith later 
refined this argument through elaboration of the concept of the dominant ethnie, 
which he views as the principal actor behind the rise of many nations. (Smith 1991) 
Smith's work is vital in that it breathed life into dominant ethnic groups, portraying 
them as real communities with subjective narratives rather than simply vessels of 
power.
Still, important omissions remained. For Smith, the dominant ethnie serves as 
a kind of chrysalis from which the modern nation emerges. It is not clear from his 
writing what fate befalls the cocoon when the moth takes flight. Certainly the 'ethnic' 
heritage remains as a resource toward which the nation sometimes veers in its modern 
odyssey. Nonetheless, we are not treated to a discussion of whether the dominant 
ethnie remains a discrete social actor within the nation - with its own ethnic 
boundaries, institutions, actors and cultural projects - that may be distinguished from 
more inclusive, statist national narratives. 
It is also difficult to apprehend the role of dominant ethnies in Smith's so-
called 'nations by design', the heterogeneous colonial states whose boundaries often 
cut across ethnic divisions. Does stewardship of the postcolonial state alternate 
between ethnic groups, or does it remain under the control of a dominant group? If 
dominant group(s) emerge, why is this the case, and what is the relationship between 
the discourse of national identity and that of the dominant ethnie? It seems abundantly 
clear that many, if not most, postcolonial states have dominant ethnies, even if these 
often lack the premodern, organic ties to the state and its national identity that one 
finds in Europe and East Asia. Writers such as Clifford Geertz (1963) have flagged up 
the legitimation crisis of the postcolonial state and the consequent struggle for ethnic 
dominance. They have pointed to dominant group repression of minorities or 
dominant ethnies' informal exchange of resources with ethnic minority clients 
(Rothchild's 'hegemonial' model) as techniques for maintaining ethnic dominance. 
(Wimmer 1997: 650) However, none have focused specifically on dominant ethnic 
groups' relationship to a wider (and distinct) national identity. Nor has there been an 
explicit conceptualisation of the shift from dominant minority to dominant majority 
ethnicity, this often remaining implicit in discussions of postcolonial ethnic 
succession. 
This can be attributed to the prevailing split in the literature between theorists 
of ethnicity in postcolonial societies and theorists of either nationalism or minority 
ethnicity in European (including European settler) or East Asian societies. They have 
done excellent work and our efforts build on their insights. However, we also attempt 
to bridge the significant gap between these literatures. Those focusing on postcolonial 
states, for example, accept the idea that dominant minority ethnicity arises out of the 
process of colonialism and decolonisation, but neglect its relationship to - and 
difference from - national identity. Those who examine European, Europe-settled or 
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East Asian cases concentrate on the nation and its exclusion of ethnic minorities, but 
fail to spot the minority-to-majority shift within these 'established' nations and the 
distinction between the nation and the dominant ethnic majority. In toto, these lacunae 
urgently need to be filled, for we live in an age when the distinction between the 
nation-state and 'its' dominant ethnie is increasingly laid bare by democratisation, 
liberalism, and/or multiculturalism. 
From Dominant Minorities to Dominant Majorities
Politically dominant minorities are those communally differentiated ruling groups 
who are able to govern majorities despite being demographically outnumbered. These 
groups are distinct from social minorities, a category that refers to disadvantaged and 
subordinate groups irrespective of their relative numerical size. Several dominant 
ethnic groups in postcolonial states are minorities. These would include the Kikuyu in 
Kenya, pre-1980 white Rhodesians, Creoles in Belize, Guyana and Trinidad, or pre-
1980 Americo-Liberians. The Sunnis in Saddam Husayn’s Iraq were a politically 
dominant minority sect whereas the Shi'ites, constituting a demographic majority, 
were the socially disadvantaged group. Likewise, Afrikaners in South Africa, Alawis 
in Syria and the Tutsi in Burundi have all governed, or are still governing, subordinate 
majorities. Unlike the majoritarian politics of democracies, the point of autocratic 
minority rule is the obverse: to narrow the circle of power as much as is militarily 
possible so as to maximise returns to the power-holding minority.  
With almost all regions of the world experiencing some degree of transition to 
democracy1, hegemonic minorities are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain rule 
in divided societies. A principal contention of this paper is that the shift from 
dominant minority to dominant majority is implicit in the logic of modern 
nationalism. Note that this paper builds upon scholarship which foregrounds the shift 
from multicultural premodern empires legitimated by divine right to the principle of 
popular sovereignty in which a 'people' needs to be defined. Such accounts rightly 
point to the exclusive tendencies brought on by these modernising forces in both 
postcolonial and western settings. (Wimmer 1997: 635) What such explanations miss, 
however, is that European or East Asian states typically contained a dominant 
minority ethnie (not merely an imperial status elite) in the premodern period. This 
dominant ethnic minority gained modern democratic legitimacy by sinking roots 
within the mass population and assimilating it to the elite ethnic core. In this manner, 
these dominant ethnic minorities 'solved' their problem of modernity in a way that 
dominant minorities in postcolonial settings - who largely failed to assimilate the 
majority - did not. 
Notice that this perspective entails a deviation from strict modernist 
interpretations which deny the existence of premodern elite ethnicity (i.e. Gellner 
1983; Anderson 1983), claiming that culture stratifies by status rather than marking 
out distinct groups in space. However, we also question versions of ethnosymbolism 
which posit the premodern diffusion of ethnic sentiments within the mass of the 
populace. Instead, we consider that premodern imperial monarchs rule with the aid of 
an aristocratic elite which often develops a sense of genealogical distinctiveness vis á 
vis dynastic competitors. Since ethnic groups are defined by a sense of shared 
genealogical ancestry, this raises the question of premodern ethnicity. Were the royal 
houses of Europe or the elites of the Islamic empires ethnic groups? We have plenty 
1 The Middle East being a notable exception (Bellin 2004; Huntington 1991: 24-5).
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of evidence that in a world of competing dynasties, genealogies were crafted and 
territorial claims defended with reference to culture and descent. (Brass 1996: 89)
For example, in 1315, Robert the Bruce, in planning an incursion into Ireland, 
wrote to the Irish, asking for their cooperation: 'Since we and you, our people and 
your people, free since ancient times, have sprung from one national stock, and a 
common language and custom stir us to come together eagerly and joyfully in 
friendship'. Likewise, around the same time, Polish rulers appealed to their shared 
language to cement claims to Pomerelia, dominated by the Teutonic Knights. (Bartlett 
1996:130) In England, Anglo-Saxon writers like Bede, and later King Alfred, helped 
to narrate a myth of the Anglo-Saxon origins of the 'English' people. (Hastings 1997: 
35-39) Though often nakedly instrumental in origin, such concepts laid the 
foundations for more enduring ethnic myths, reproduced in path-dependent fashion by 
elite institutions. 
In the medieval or early modern period, for instance, a number of chronicles 
and origin myths sprang up around ruling elites. Thus in Scotland, the Declaration of 
Arbroath of 1320 made reference to the fact that 'the "Scots" were descended from the 
early medieval Irish immigrants'. (MacDonald 2005:86) Genealogies helped to 
cement dynastic rule, but also underpinned myths of descent for what Smith terms 
'lateral-aristocratic' ethnies of the classical, medieval or early modern period like the 
Parthians, Hittites, Persians, Arabs, Ottoman Turks, English, French, Poles, 
Hungarians and Castilians. (Smith 1986: 78-79)
It may be convincingly objected that aristocratic ethnicity, owing to its elite 
character and lack of social penetration, cannot be described in ethnic group terms. 
We are prepared to bracket this question, which remains a subject of intense debate 
between modernist and ethnosymbolist theorists. (Ozkirimli 2007; Leoussi 2006) 
Indeed, the norm of dominant ethnic minority rule becomes especially apposite when 
one imagines a self-conscious ethnic elite ruling over a highly variegated Gellnerian 
cultural terrain such as medieval France, Austria, India or Italy. In this sense, the 
medieval Frankish-descended dynasty of France was a French aristocratic ethnie 
which ruled not ethnic Frenchmen, but rather a patchwork of local nobles and 
peasants speaking Latin, Celtic and Germanic dialects. Hence the French differed 
little from Ottoman Turks and Austro-Germans who dominated ostensibly more 
'multicultural' empires. The basic principle remains, however: dominant minorities 
were the rule in the premodern world, and most of these were ethnically 
consciousness.
Dominant Minorities in the Modern Era
A handful of dominant minorities managed to persist into the modern era and many 
arose through colonial and post-colonial processes. Four observations can be made 
with regards to politically dominant ethnic minorities in modern states: they normally 
owe their dominant position to colonial legacies; they rely on coercive policies while 
building a narrow societal support base; they establish distinct links to overarching 
national identities; and they have been historically more common than they are at 
present due to democratisation processes that shift power to majorities. 
Colonial Impact
Colonialism facilitated minority political dominance in more than one way. First, 
European occupiers carved modern states and created centralised governing 
institutions where none had existed, thus granting those at the highest echelon of the 
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newly introduced administration unprecedented political authority. Second, they 
actively placed minorities in positions of governance. In some cases, including South 
Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), and the Caribbean Islands, 
European settlers that arrived with colonialism ruled as a dominant minority over an 
indigenous population. In other cases, colonial regimes practiced divide-and-rule 
policies that favoured one indigenous minority, handed it a superior social status, and 
co-opted it into the governing apparatus and the security forces. The colonial legacy 
allowed favoured minorities to either retain dominance or take over the state at a later 
point.
The most prominent example of colonial settler domination is that of South 
Africa. This country had seen settlers arrive from the Netherlands and Britain, as well 
as from other European countries. Immigration of Dutch settlers first started in the 
17th century, while large scale immigration of English-speakers from Britain took off 
in the early 19th century. Unsuccessful resistance to British encroachment culminated 
in the Boer War (1899-1902), which in turn resulted in the formation of the Union of 
South Africa, a name later changed to the Republic of South Africa. The political 
structure introduced in the first half of the twentieth century extended political rights 
to the white population with only a few nonwhites in the southern Cape province 
entitled to vote. The regime practiced racial segregation and nonwhite subordination. 
Following the victory of the Afrikaner National Party in the 1948 elections, the 
apartheid policy of formal, legalised racial classification and reordering was 
introduced. It was only with the first democratic elections of 1994 that minority 
domination was replaced with majority political rule. 
In cases of indigenous minority rule, European occupiers, whether British, 
French, or otherwise, introduced modern state institutions and placed favoured 
minorities in positions of authority. In Burundi, for example, Tutsi political hegemony 
was facilitated by Belgian policies that advanced an ideology of Tutsi racial 
superiority (albeit without residential segregation), not dissimilar to the legislated race 
classification of apartheid, and required all members of society to carry identification 
cards that identified their ethnic affiliation, and hence their social status. Members of 
the Tutsi elite were incorporated into the senior ranks of the administration and 
military while the Hutu were downgraded to the status of inferior subjects. In the 
newly introduced Conseil Superieur du Pays, 31 of 33 members where Tutsi (Uvin 
1998: 17). Furthermore, previously independent chiefdoms were consolidated into 
new administrative units by the Belgians. All 45 of the newly created chiefdoms were 
Tutsi controlled. When the Belgian colonizers departed, the institutional infrastructure 
left behind was conducive to Tutsi domination of the civil administration and the 
military (Lemarchand 1994). 
Likewise, the origins of Sunni hegemony in Iraq date back to the very 
beginning of its construction by the British (which in turn may be traced further back 
to the looser Sunni hegemony which prevailed after the Sunni Ottoman conquest of 
Iraq's three component provinces from the Shi'ite Safavids in 1638). Following their 
victory in World War I, the British created Iraq by joining three former Ottoman 
provinces: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, thus bringing together the Shi'ite population in 
the south with a Sunni Arab minority in the central region and the Kurdish minority in 
the North within a single political unit. The British brought their ally in their war 
against the Ottoman Empire, Hashemite Faysal ibn Husayn, from Syria and crowned 
him as king of Iraq. The ruling dynasty, thus, was foreign to the local population 
(Eppel 2004: 15). Furthermore, the urban Sunni Arab elites from the Baghdad region 
were integrated into the administrative institutions and practically monopolised 
5
military and administrative authority. According to Yitzhak Nakash (1994: 110), 
when Iraq gained its independence in 1932, only about 15 percent of high-ranking 
government posts were held by Shi'ites.  The communal features of the organisational 
infrastructure were retained after independence was formally obtained. The 
characteristics of the administration and military led the majority of the Shi'ites, 
approximately 60 percent of Iraq's population, and the Kurds, roughly 20 percent, to 
view the newly created Iraqi state as a Sunni-Arab institution (Eppel 2004: 17). Sunni 
Arab hegemony was solid and did not change even after the monarchy was 
overthrown in a 1958 coup. 
French legacies in Syria were comparable although it took several decades 
after independence before the Alawi minority, constituting approximately 11 percent 
of Syria's population, took over control of the state. Until the arrival of the French, the 
Alawi minority had an inferior status (Antoun 1991; Haklai 2000; Zisser 1999: 129-
31). However, as in the case of Burundi's Tutsis and Iraq's Sunnis, Syria's Alawi 
population were a minority favoured by the European occupiers. Two important 
features of French rule, lasting from 1920 to 1946, contributed to Alawi 
empowerment. First the French granted the Alawis an autonomous status in their 
home region which, in turn, provided the previously subordinate minority with the 
administrative skills required for governance. Second, recruitment patterns to the 
security apparatus gave preference to this minority because the growing nationalist 
resistance within Syria came from Sunni quarters. The Alawis were seen by the 
French as reliable allies, who could be counted upon to suppress nationalist revolts 
(Haklai 2000: 32). Although the Alawis lost their autonomous status in 1936, their 
disproportionate presence in the military remained after French withdrawal. Their 
representation grew as a series of military coups resulted in the expulsion from the 
military of many of the senior officers, mostly Sunni, thus opening up space for Alawi 
promotion. Alawi officers played an important role in the 1963 Ba'th coup, something 
that allowed them to further consolidate their position in the military at the officer 
ranks and to eventually overthrow the Sunni president, Amin al-Hafiz, in 1966.    
Governing Strategies
The very means through which dominant minorities attained their superior political 
status - whether as a settler society or a favoured indigenous minority - meant that 
sub-state group identities were politically salient following the departure of the 
European superpowers and, therefore, dominant minorities were to face challenges. 
Maintaining minority political hegemony necessitated extensive reliance on the 
coercive exclusion of majorities from decision-making centres. In Apartheid South 
Africa, for example, minority rule was contingent upon the denial of suffrage to the 
vast majority of nonwhites. In Taiwan too, Martial Law enacted by mainland Chinese 
settlers, who arrived following the Communist Revolution on the mainland in 1949, 
excluded the Taiwanese majority, approximately 84 percent of Taiwan's total 
population, from participation in politics for several decades. 
In many cases, dominant indigenous minorities established pervasive 
authoritarian regimes with an extensive security apparatus to ensure majority 
marginalisation.  In Iraq, according to data compiled from the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (2002: 105-6, 279), the regime employed about 19.4 persons per 
thousand in the armed forces at the beginning of the twenty-first century, whereas in 
Syria, the number was close to 26 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002: 
117-8, 282). The extent to which these figures are high is revealed when compared to 
the numbers in democracies like Canada, where there are 2 people under arms per 
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thousand, Spain, where the number is close to 6.3, and Brazil where the number is 
slightly below 4 (Ibid: 36-7, 55-8, 173-5, 252, 255, 310). Even when compared to 
other authoritarian regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the numbers are 10.2 
and 11 respectively, dominant minority regimes are more heavily securitised (Ibid: 
102-3, 116-7, 279 & 282).  
Extensive security apparatuses have routinely been used to make sure that all 
citizens were deterred from dissent. This message was delivered through merciless 
suppression of all communally-motivated resistance and opposition activism. For 
example, the Kurdish uprising in Iraq in 1974 resulted in the massacre of thousands of 
Kurds and the relocation of tens of thousands to southern Iraq (Whitely 1993-94). In 
the late 1980s, chemical weapons were used against the Kurds and about 50,000 of 
them were reportedly killed by the regime in the Anfal campaigns (Bengio 1999: 153). 
Likewise, Shi’ite (and Kurdish) uprisings throughout the 1990s were brutality 
repressed. Roughly a quarter of a million Shi’ites in southern Iraq were forcefully 
driven out after approximately forty thousand soldiers descended upon the region and 
the local marshes were drained (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 108). Similarly, 
attempted revolts in Syria were brutally suppressed. When a rebellious force of the 
Muslim Brotherhood took over the city of Hama in 1982, imprisoning several local 
officials, including the governor, the army descended upon the city with heavy 
artillery and its combat air force, killing tens of thousands of local inhabitants. In all 
these cases, the message of the regime was unequivocal and left no room for 
pondering regime change. The forcefully instilled widespread belief in regime 
omnipotence, in turn, had created a cycle where opposition movements stopped 
mobilizing, which in turn further consolidated the minority's hold on power. 
In places where dominant minorities were unable to sustain an expansive and 
deterring security apparatus, minority rule faced repeated challenges and revolts. 
Minority rule in Burundi, lasting until an internationally brokered agreement in 2003 
enabled a gradual transition of power to an elected majority Hutu government, was 
least stable. In Burundi, about seven people per thousand were employed in the armed 
forces by the state at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a number much lower 
than in Iraq and Syria (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002: 197 & 321). 
Presumably, the poor fiscal condition of the minority regime in Burundi accounts for 
its inability to sustain a security apparatus similar to those of oil rich Iraq or Syria, 
which for many decades enjoyed Soviet patronage and reaped economic benefits from 
its occupation of Lebanon. Consequently, the Tutsi regime had difficulty containing 
the numerous uprisings and revolts that took place in every decade after 
independence. The violence frequently resulted in mass displacements and hundreds 
of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu deaths. The conventional response of the regime up 
until the late 1980s was to intensify the exclusion of Hutus from positions of 
authority. Following a 1965 coup and the abolition of the monarchy in 1966, only 
three of the seventeen army officers of the newly created National Revolutionary 
Council, the institution which centralised political authority in Burundi, were Hutu. 
By the end of Colonel Bagaza's reign (1976-1987), only two Hutu members remained 
in the 65 member central committee of the UPRONA Party, which became the state’s 
supreme institution in 1979 (Lemarchand 1994: 78-109). Ethnic cleansing of the 
military, the ruling UPRONA Party, the fragile civil administration, and the military 
of Hutus did not, however, lead to Hutu submission. Rather, it led many to join 
independent militias to fight the minority regime for control over the state (Adekange 
1996: 38-41; Lemarchand 1994: 72).  Attempts to introduce reform in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s only served to polarize Burundi politics as Hutu candidates won 80% 
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of the seats in the newly created national assembly in the 1993 election. The military 
responded by staging a coup shortly thereafter to reverse the verdict at the polls. Once 
again, the military was unable to subdue the widespread resentment and turmoil that 
ensued and that was manifested in a long civil war which claimed the lives of 
hundreds of thousands.    
Significantly, commanding positions in the security agencies, as well as in 
other governing agencies of minority regimes, were commonly placed in the hands of 
loyalists. At the core of Hafiz al-Asad's regime in Syria, for example, were members 
of the Alawi Kalbiyya tribe as well as leading members from other large Alawi tribes, 
including the Matawira and Haddadin (Zisser 1999: 135-6). Dividing the most senior 
positions in the security apparatus between the large Alawi clans, Asad, whose reign 
lasted from 1970 to 2000, was able to build a narrow but loyal circle of confidants. 
This Alawi alliance ensured that the major players in the Alawi community had every 
interest in sustaining minority rule, yet no single tribe was powerful enough to 
overthrow Asad's regime alone. A broader coalition, in the form of a second layer 
outside the primary core, was built with other minorities who had much to lose from 
majority-Sunni rule. Isma'ilis and Druze were integrated into the second layer of 
power centres when members of these communities were appointed to important, if 
not the most superior, positions in the security apparatus.  This order was largely 
preserved after Bashar Asad succeeded his father in 2000 (Zisser 2007: 60-73).
Likewise, in Iraq, the Sunni rulers placed particular emphasis on hegemony in 
the security apparatus. By 1936, less than four years after independence was gained, 
95 percent of the senior officers were Sunnis (Tarbush 1982: 80-82). Although Shi'ite 
discontent in the 1930s and 1940s led to increased representation in the government 
and civil service - majority sect representation in the government reached 36 percent 
in 1950 (Nakash 1994: 127) - and to the appointment of the first Shi'ite prime 
minister, Salih Jabir, in 1947, Sunni resistance reversed the trend and the Prime 
Minister was forced to resign. Following the Ba'th takeover in 1968, the innermost 
circle narrowed even further. The regime relied first-and-foremost on members of the 
Tikrit tribe from where the leadership, including Saddam Husayn, arose.  Alliances 
with other major tribes within the Sunni community constituted the second and 
subsequent layers of regime support base. The Republican Guard, composed mostly 
of tribes affiliated with the regime, and the paramilitary unit known as ‘Saddam’s 
Fedayeen’, became two of the most important security agencies and were entrusted 
with ensuring regime safety.    
While exercising brutal suppression to coerce submission, minority 
authoritarian regimes have also frequently relied on one-party rule to broaden their 
support base and provide incentives for individuals to join the ruling party and, thus, 
also support the regime. In Burundi, the UPRONA Party was made the sole governing 
institution in 1979; in Iraq and Syria, constitutions introduced in the 1960s made the 
Ba'th institutions the supreme institutions of the state. In all three cases, therefore, the 
single-ruling parties were transformed into the state while the presidency of the party 
overlapped with the presidency of the state and command of the military. In Iraq, the 
Ba’th’s Revolution Command Council (RCC) and its Chairman turned into the 
highest and exclusive decision-making body (Baram 1989), with the Chairman taking 
on the role of president of Iraq and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. By one 
estimate, a quarter of the Ba’th Regional Command, from whom members of the RCC 
used to be elected, were Tikritis by the late 1970s (Henderson 1991, 34). According to 
Hanna Batatu (1999: 177-9), the number of members in the Syrian Ba'th party had 
increased from 65,398 in 1971 to 1,008,243 in 1992, approximately 14.5 percent of all 
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Syrians eligible to join the party (age fourteen and above). In comparison, 9 percent of 
the Soviet Union's adult population were members of the Communist Party. Yet the 
Syrian regime created two categories of membership: 'full members' and supporting or 
'associate members'. The vast majority of party members, normally around 80 percent, 
belonged to the latter category, which meant that they were not eligible to vote in the 
party's institutions, occupy senior or middle-level positions in the party hierarchy, and 
hence, yield political influence. Associate membership, however, has its own benefits. 
The party has been providing easier access to resources, particularly to peasants from 
the Alawi and other minority communities but also to rural Sunnis (Ibid: 185-6; Zisser 
2007)). Integrating into networks of patronage has become a useful avenue for 
upward social mobility. As peasant clients, party members can hope for improved 
irrigation systems, preferential treatment by state bureaucrats, and priority in 
development projects. A similar dynamic occurred in the Iraqi Ba’th regime. The 
UPRONA in Burundi, conversely, did not possess similar fiscal capacity and, 
therefore, has a more difficult time building extensive networks of patronage and 
extending its outreach beyond its immediate constituency.   
Dominant Minorities and National Identity
Denial of majority-group access to political participation has often been accompanied 
by manipulation of overarching identities. In South Africa, the official ideology 
unified the Europeans into a single white nation and excluded the majority from 
membership in the nation. The nonwhites were separated into nine tribal national 
groups, who were denationalised when the regime established nine separate tribal 
states, known as Bantustans, for them on about 13 percent of the land (Adam and 
Moodley 2005: 51-53).
In other instances, authoritarian regimes promoted a unifying national 
ideology or a supra-ethnic identity by introducing notions of collective historical 
memory and shared destiny. The ideologies, used as tools to control majorities, were 
often advanced using coercive means. In Burundi, for example, the Bagaza 
government (1976-87) outlawed the usage of ethnic group names, while Kirundi, 
Burundi’s official language, became the only language of instruction in schools. 
Meanwhile, the Ba'th regimes in Iraq and Syria attempted to promote a Pan-Arab 
identity and downplay religious differentiation. The official doctrine of the party 
declares that language, rather than religion or sect, is definitive of national identity 
(Baram 1989: 448). At the same time, Saddam Husayn added the phrase 'Allah u-
Akbar' onto the Iraqi flag to stress factors uniting Muslims, whether Shi'ites and 
Sunnis, and to emphasise that the regime, despite Ba'th official secular ideology, was 
in practice friendly to its religious constituents. Likewise, Syrian television has been 
regularly broadcasting mosque attendance by the Alawi president. In the same vein, 
the Iran-Iraq war was referred to as Qadissiyat-Saddam, evoking an old mythical war 
that unified Arabs against Persians and facilitated the spread of Islam eastwards. The 
Ba’th regimes in both countries have often tried to portray themselves as leaders in 
the common Arab goal against shared enemies including Israel and “the West” (Seale 
and Butler 1996).  
What we therefore find in postcolonial societies where there is no organic link 
between dominant ethnies and the state, is a recourse to an inclusive national 
ideology. These nationalisms are of the 'missionary' type described by Kumar and 
Roshwald. (Kumar 2003; Roshwald 2006:185-186) In other words, the nation views 
itself through a lens of universalist ideology, as the leading (if not chosen) missionary 
for the wider idea. In its exploits for the greater cause, recognised by others, the 
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nation is glorified and attains its identity. In the Syrian and Iraqi cases - as with Egypt 
and Jordan - the nation serves as an exemplar of pan-Arabism. Similarly, in Julius 
Nyerere's Tanzania, national identity was realised through service to pan-Africanism 
and nonaligned socialism. In each case, the ideology is ostensibly supranational, but 
the focal point remains the bounded nation, which accrues glory for its contribution to 
the wider cause. 
In many postcolonial societies, coalition politics is common, in which a 
dominant minority mobilises a wider ethnic coalition around it and crafts a more 
inclusive, missionary, national identity. Such ideologies need not be completely 
inclusive, and often exclude at the pan-ethnic level. We have already seen how Syrian 
and Iraqi 'civic' pan-Arabism grated against non-Arab minorities like the Kurds. This 
is also true of Iran's Shi'a Islamic national identity after 1979, which includes some 92 
percent of the population, but excludes the 7-8 percent non-Shia minority. 
Of course, national identity can be more ethnically explicit in its exclusivity. 
Here dominant ethnicity and nationhood substantially overlap as concepts, though the 
definition of the nation remains contested by minorities and by moderates within the 
dominant ethnie. Thus the Bété of southern Côte D'Ivoire, led by Laurent Ggabo's FPI 
party, have mobilised a coalition of southern 'autochthonous' Ivoirian ethnies (Bété, 
Dida, Neyo, Bakwe, Kroumen, Guéré) against northerners who are often portrayed as 
'foreigners'. Ivoirité, a kind of southern pan-ethnic nationalism, became the official 
state ideology, a divisive narrative precipitated by paramilitaries who began to carry 
out violent ethnic pogroms against those of northern origin after 2002. (Marshall-
Fratani 2006: 21-32) The same could be said about the Islamist identity of northern 
Nigerian states or Sudan and its alienating effect on their Christian fellow nationals. 
(Laitin 1998) Indeed, in much of Africa, ethnicity has an 'onion'-like quality, with 
dominant ethnic minorities leading pan-ethnic majority coalitions, each with its own 
ethno-national project. (Feree 2004) This may in turn be combined with a more 
inclusive missionary-style civic nationalism, but the glue of socialism, pan-
Africanism and other postcolonial ideologies has lost potency with the demise of the 
Cold War and the rise of democratisation - all of which places the accent on solid 
ethnic coalitions. The upshot is that secure dictators could more easily flirt with 
inclusive identities than their more insecure democratic successors who must placate 
an ethnic electoral base.
The Decline of Minority Dominance 
The prevalence of minority dominance began to change, as we know, after 1789. 
Once power was vested in the nation and popular sovereignty replaced the principle 
of the divine right of kings, the stage was set for majorities to usurp the 'illegitimate' 
rule of dominant minorities. Nationalism and democracy went hand in hand. In lands 
where 'foreign' rulers were dominant (i.e. Habsburgs in the Czech lands, British in 
Ireland), dominant minorities came under pressure to leave. In other cases, aristocratic 
ethnies (i.e. English, Turkish, French, Italian) successfully negotiated the pitfalls of 
modernity and penetrated down the social scale, homogenising diverse dialect zones. 
In the latter set of cases, aristocrats (where not killed by Republicans) were elbowed 
aside by democratic rulers but granted a symbolic role as monarchs in the new nation-
states. This in contrast to the provinces of multi-ethnic empires where 'foreign' 
aristocratic ethnies like the Ottoman Turks, Austro-Germans, Baltic Russians or 
Anglo-Irish were driven from power and excised from the nation. As Wimmer notes, 
the nationalist revolution is also an ethnic revolution in which the dominant 'native' 
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ethnic group is elevated and ethnic minorities (including formerly dominant 
minorities) are expelled or marginalised. (Wimmer 2002)
Among the elite minorities who lost in the transition to modernity or during 
processes of democratisation, we might include: 'the Manchus in China and the Tatars 
in Russia; in Africa pockets of former European colonists left in Kenya, the Maghreb 
and pre-eminently, since 1994, the Afrikaners of South Africa, and the Arabs of 
Zanzibar; in Latin America possibly one could count the Spanish-descended Creoles 
after the Mestizos or mixed bloods seized power from them; and in Europe the Anglo-
Irish and the various German, Hungarian and Turkish communities which were left 
outside of their former homelands' (Wright 2004: 32). To this list we might add the 
former Russian minorities in the Baltic and Central Asia after the collapse of the 
USSR; Serbs of Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia post-Milosevic; the Americo-Liberians 
and white Rhodesians, Tutsi of Burundi, and the Sunnis of Iraq. The latter two groups 
saw their decline following recent elections. In both cases, the transition has been 
painful and accompanied by civil wars. The result of the1993 election in Burundi (the 
country’s first open election since 1965) that saw a Hutu majority win proved 
unacceptable to the Tutsi-dominated elite. As a result, a bloody civil war ensued. The 
transition to majority rule only consolidated with the help of an internationally 
brokered peace agreement in 2003. The agreement provided constitutional provisions 
for protecting the previously privileged minority, yet ultimately enabled an elected 
majority Hutu government to take over in 2005. Meanwhile, the demise of minority 
rule in Iraq has yet to produce a clear outcome. A new constitution in 2005 enabled an 
election for a 275-member Council of Representatives. The outcome of the elections 
demonstrated the salience of the sectarian cleavages, yet the democratisation process 
has been held back as Sunni insurgents have been resisting the new regime.   
We could also include groups which benefited from higher status (though not 
necessarily dominance) by allying themselves with the colonisers. These would 
include ethnies as diverse as Tamils in Sri Lanka, Ambonese in Indonesia, Lozi of 
Zambia and trading minorities of South Asians in Africa, Chinese in Southeast Asia, 
or Lebanese in Africa and the Caribbean. (Horowitz 1985:192). Trading minorities 
are the subject of Amy Chua's recent (2002) work, which draws attention to their 
vulnerable situation due to decolonisation and democratisation, which removed much 
of their protection and legitimacy. Globalisation adds fuel to the populist fire by 
sharpening economic disparities between elite trading minorities and impoverished 
(but newly empowered) dominant majorities. This cocktail can lead to majority 
reprisals against trading minorities, extending to pogroms (as in Uganda or Indonesia) 
or even genocide. (Chua 2002) The so-called 'third wave' of democratisation after 
1989 has accelerated a pattern of majoritisation which began in 1789, gained 
momentum after 1914-18, and entered onto a wider plane with decolonisation. 
Secession and democracy are thus the midwives which give birth to newly 
empowered dominant majorities and downwardly mobile elite minorities. 
International norms shift from recognising the claims of suzerainty to those of self-
determination. (Mayall 1994: 275) Even if a separatist minority achieves mere 
autonomy rather than independence, the pole of dominance can be reversed. In this 
sense, the Anglo-Canadians of Quebec after 1960 have much in common with the 
English in post-1960s Scotland or Castilians of post-Franco Catalonia in experiencing 
downward symbolic mobility. (Zuelow 1998)
Dominant Majorities and National Identity
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As early as 1971, Walker Connor drew attention to the fact that even though 
more than 90 percent of the world's 132 states were multi-ethnic, over 70 percent of 
states had an ethnic majority. (Connor 1994: 96) The breakup of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, coupled with a number of successful secessionist movements means that 
the proportion with a majority has increased. Thus a more recent dataset covering 151 
countries finds that just 27 (18 percent) lack a majority ethnic group. Even among the 
27 states which lacked a majority in 1998, 14 had a plurality of over 40 percent, a 
further 9 had a plurality group of 30-40 percent, with just two, Kenya (22 percent 
Kikuyu) and Liberia (19 percent Kpelle) having fewer. This overstates ethno-
demographic dominance to some degree, given that Alawi were classed as Arab, 
Taiwanese as Chinese, and some other nested minorities aggregated into their pan-
ethnic groups. But even if we disaggregate these groups, this only adds 9 new 
dominant groups (20 if we include whites in tropical Latin America). Most states 
without a majority possess a healthy plurality group.2 In other words, there are as few 
deeply multicultural states as there are monocultural ones.
The near-universal presence of ethnic majorities (or pluralities) in the world 
mattered less when power accrued to a minority. However, the modern shift in power 
from dominant minorities to majorities raises questions about the relationship between 
dominant majority ethnicity and the national identity of the state. Earlier, we saw how 
dominant minorities in postcolonial settings pursued a dual strategy of reinforcing 
their own ethnic identity and privileges while simultaneously crafting a more 
inclusive national identity (such as pan-Arabism) at the state level. The same appears 
true for dominant pluralities and majorities. They, too, may be drawn to missionary 
nationalism in order to smooth legitimacy among their minority constituents. Iran's 
post-1979 Shi'a Islamism and Jordan's Hashemite pan-Arabism provide examples of 
missionary nationalisms carried by dominant ethnies (Persians, Transjordanians) 
which comprise a plurality of the population. The same is true of Ghana, where the 
40-45 percent Akan ethnic plurality - incarnated in the person of Kwame Nkrumah - 
sponsored a missionary national identity based on pan-Africanism and nonaligned 
socialism. (Brown 2000) In the southern Caribbean states of Belize, Suriname and 
Trinidad, Creoles of African descent (comprising a plurality or bare majority of the 
population) have managed to emerge as dominant ethnic groups, taking over from 
white settlers after decolonisation. Here, national identities based on creolised English 
or Dutch language and customs have come to be accepted, in part if not wholesale, by 
Asian minorities. Creole legitimacy rests upon their earlier arrival as manumitted 
slaves (predating Indian indentured labourers), higher degree of integration into the 
colonial power structure and European culture, and their earlier urbanisation. (St. 
Hilaire 2001)
Nonetheless, ethnic boundaries remain and ethnic politics lurks beneath the 
veneer of civic nationalism. This can be seen in Nkrumah's anti-Ewe rhetoric in 1970s 
Ghana, designed in part to placate the sentiments of the dominant Akan (Ashanti) 
ethnie. Even Nkrumah's more 'inclusive' successor, Jerry Rawlings, felt obliged to 
appear in Akan traditional dress to appeal to his core constituency even as he 
preached the rhetoric of an inclusive pan-African, socialist nationalism. (Brown 2000: 
115-16) In Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew's inclusive national identity based on 'Asian 
values' did not prevent Chinese dominant ethnicity being reinforced by immigration 
policies favouring ethnic Chinese over Malays and Indians (in order to maintain the 
ethnic balance) or 'speak Mandarin' campaigns of the 1980s. (Brown 2000: 94-101) In 
2 I am indebted to Tatu Vanhanen for this dataset. For further details, see (Vanhanen 1999).
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Iran, the Persian language and the dominance of ethnic Persians in the government 
remains, despite its official missionary nationalism based on Shi'a Islam. Socially, 
Persians remain a dominant group, with non-Persians (i.e. Azeris, Kurds) 
experiencing varying degrees of exclusion in public life outside their ethnic regions. 
Meanwhile, in Jordan, electoral gerrymandering has successfully kept the slender 
Palestinian majority from achieving control, despite the official rhetoric of pan-Arab 
unity. (Frisch 2002) In Trinidad, Asian and Creole parties continue to conflict, despite 
the presence of certain unifying Creole-influenced symbols such as cricket and 
Caribbean cuisine.
In other cases, dominant ethnicity dominates unabashedly as ethnic 
nationalism, maintaining little pretence of neutrality. Apartheid South Africa, 
Malaysia, Fiji after the 2000 coup, Côte d'Ivoire, pre-1972 Northern Ireland, Israel, 
post-independence Estonia, Croatia and Latvia furnish contemporary examples. Even 
if dominant majority elites are receptive to minority claims in the name of national 
unity, they often accede to pressure from their ethnic base. In contemporary Iraq, for 
example, Sunni violence has often been met by calls from the Shiite-dominated 
government for Iraqi unity. Major Shi'a party leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr have also 
tried to take a broader, national perspective. However, this has prompted resistance 
from grassroots Shi'a, who demand that the leadership acknowledge their Shi'a and 
not merely Iraqi identity, name Sunnis as perpetrators, and minister more directly to 
Shi'a sectarian concerns by endorsing violent responses to Sunni attacks. ('Al Askari 
Mosque Destroyed Sparking Sectarian Violence' 2006)
Likewise, in Northern Ireland, attempts by reforming Unionist Prime 
Ministers of Northern Ireland like Terence O'Neill (1966-69), James Chichester-Clark 
(1969-71) and Brian Faulkner (1971-74) to water down Protestant privileges in 
housing, electoral districting and public employment in the name of Northern 
Ireland's 'British' unity were met by extensive popular Unionist revolt. Dominant 
majority ethnicity - expressed through both the mainstream Orange Order and Ulster 
Unionist Party as well as the independent Unionism of Ian Paisley - resulted in the 
downfall of these reformist Protestant politicians. As with David Trimble a quarter of 
a century later, each leader had relied on hardline ethnic credentials to gain power, 
but, once at the helm, softened their rhetoric in favour of cross-community 
reconciliation at the behest of the British government. In the final analysis, the official 
narrative of an inclusive, nonsectarian Britishness was derailed by Ulster-Protestant 
ethnic concerns. (Kaufmann 2007; Patterson and Kaufmann. 2007)
Dominant Ethnicity's Persistence in the Modern West
The Northern Ireland example shows that dominant ethnicity is as pervasive within as 
outwith the West. The American case is especially noteworthy, since official 
American universalist rhetoric on liberalism ('all men are created equal') contrasted so 
sharply with the reality of white, Anglo-Protestant dominance in the pre-1965 period. 
This dissonance has been expressed by thinkers as diverse as Ralph Waldo Emerson 
('double consciousness') in the 1840s and Gunnar Myrdal ('An American Dilemma') 
in the 1940s. As in contemporary Jordan or pre-1972 Northern Ireland, minority 
voters were disenfranchised using indirect measures. Catholics and Jews, 
concentrated in the urban northeast, were neutralised by malapportioned 
congressional districts which gave the largely white Protestant countryside an 
enormous advantage over the polyglot cities. (Kaufmann 2004b) Poll taxes, 
cumbersome electoral registration procedures or literacy tests (as well as local 
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intimidation) simultaneously silenced the black vote in the lowland South. 
Meanwhile, exclusive social networks and overt discrimination helped ensure Anglo-
Protestant domination of top echelons of the military, cabinet, corporations and Ivy 
League universities until the 1960s. (Mills 1956: 60; Anderson 1970: 143-45) The 
equivalent metaphor for pre-1970 Canadian WASP hegemony is the 'vertical mosaic' 
in which British Canadians dominated despite talk of Canadian multiethnicity. (Porter 
1965)
Thus we can see, in both developed and developing countries, that various 
indirect techniques can maintain de facto dominant ethnicity, even in the absence of 
de jure hegemony. Poll taxes, language and literacy tests may exclude potential 
voters, as in Estonia or Latvia, where a significant proportion of ethnic Russian 
residents are non-citizens and thus cannot vote. Candidate selection and recruitment in 
major parties can discriminate against ethnic outsiders running for office or gaining 
high positions within the government, military or police force. Immigrant minorities 
in developed countries may even acquiesce in this cultural hegemony by pushing 
members of the dominant group to the top of their secular organisations, as with the 
mainly British and Irish ancestry of many twentieth century American labour, 
Catholic church and city leaders, whose membership, parishioners or electorate were 
mainly southern and Eastern European in origin.
That said, the New Left has, since the 1960s, concentrated its liberal-
egalitarian scrutiny ever more closely upon covert dominant ethnic practices in 
western countries. This has expanded to encompass post-2004 EU accession states 
like Latvia and Estonia, which have been called to account for denying citizenship to 
Baltic-born ethnic Russians who have failed to pass language tests and surmount other 
bureaucratic hurdles. (Jurado 2006) Liberal 'best practices' promoted by the OSCE 
and European Commission even extend to non-discriminatory immigration and 
refugee policies, thereby directly challenging ethno-national congruence. These have 
also, in the much looser guise of global, 'postnational' norms (Soysal 1994), prompted 
non-European societies like Japan or the Gulf Arab states to pay lip service to 
principles of ethnic neutrality, even if they do not, in practice, abide by them.
Increasingly, therefore, we find that dominant ethnicity is being challenged, at 
least in some western societies. This comes about as a consequence of ideas about 
multiculturalism and immigration, which inserts a wedge between dominant ethnies 
(often majorities) and 'their' nation-state. (Kaufmann 2004a) Whereas traditional 
leftist politics tended to ignore cultural divisions in favour of economic disparities, the 
New Left and its heirs now stress race and culture more than class. This places 
traditional left politics in direct conflict with dominant ethnicity. The greater reliance 
of the native working class on their ethnic identities as a source of status, coupled 
with the declining salience of class issues for left-wing parties, helps explain why 
sections of the native working class in western Europe have switched their allegiance 
from socialist to far right or centre-right parties. (Betz and Immerfall. 1998)
State narratives of nationhood stress inclusion and forward-looking projects, 
hence the 'Britishness' of Gordon Brown and New Labour, or the ‘civic nationalism’ 
of the Parti Quebecois, Scottish National Party or Convergència Democràtica de 
Catalunya. Explicit ethnic nationalism exists mostly on the far right of the political 
spectrum and few contemplate the notion of the state speaking in the name of a 
particular ethnic group, as in pre-1972 Northern Ireland or in Israel. (Smooha 2002) 
But between these poles, and beneath the canopy of 'inclusive' state discourse, we still 
find the old cut-and-thrust of ethnic interaction and conflict, in which the dominant 
group remains a more-or-less cohesive sociological actor. It may not overtly speak its 
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name, but dominant ethnicity persists and becomes increasingly self-conscious in 
proportion to the degree it feels embattled by immigration, affirmative action and 
multiculturalism. (Gallagher 1997) 
In this sense, there is a difference between the ethnic nationalism identified by 
Smith, Brubaker, Kohn and others - a situation where dominant ethnicity and state 
nationhood neatly overlap and constitute each other - and the increasingly common 
occurrence in which an inclusive 'civic' nationalism at the official level coexists with 
dominant ethnicity in the 'lower' echelons of civil society. Inclusive state citizenship is 
prevalent in the public sphere, but more exclusive dominant ethnic narratives and 
boundaries persist in civil society, the private sphere, and the interstices of the public 
sphere. These currents occasionally intrude into national politics in the guise of issues 
like immigration, crime, cultural policy or concerns about welfare abuse, but even if 
not as apparent at the national level, dominant ethnicity in the West is politically 
expressed at the local level in ethnically diverse wards, cities and regions. The British 
National Party, for example, has no parliamentary presence, but in May 2006 posted 
its best ever showing in local elections, and now controls 55 English councils.
The emergence of a distinct sense of dominant ethnicity (as distinct from state-
nationality) is evident from recent British research. For example, the proportion of 
respondents in England identifying themselves as 'English not British' in surveys has 
increased from 30 to 40 percent between 1992 and 2005. (Economist 2007) Whereas 
fans once waved the British Union Jack at England football matches, the English 
Cross of St. George has taken its place, and its display in the windows of homes and 
vehicles serves as a badge of English ethnicity. This text runs in parallel to the waves 
of inclusive 'Britishness' discourse propounded by successive British governments and 
reaching a crescendo under Gordon Brown's Labour Party. Meanwhile, debates over 
immigration and integration in many European and Anglo-Saxon settler societies 
expose the social division between 'natives' (dominant ethnies) and 'foreigners' at 
local level - facts which fit uneasily within an official story of inclusive state 
nationalism. 
 
'White flight' from diverse areas to more homogeneous locales is one of the 
most important forms of modern western dominant ethnicity since it latently 
reconstitutes ethnic boundaries without the need for the kind of manifest ethno-
nationalist politics which would violate the acutely developed liberal norms of 
western societies. Michael Walzer rues these trends, instead defending the power of 
The sovereign state ...to make its own admissions policy, to control and 
sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants...The distinctiveness of cultures and 
groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable 
feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people…seem 
to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere. (Walzer 1983: 39)
Walzer favours national immigration restrictions over free immigration and 
private ethnic segregation since he reasons that national cohesion can better maintain 
social welfare systems, cultures and common goals than ethnically segregated 
enclaves. (Chang 2007: 9) Proponents of multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 
2006), conversely, have argued that ethnic diversity does not inevitably lead to the 
decline of the welfare state. Indeed, many western states have opted for policies that 
run counter to Walzer's hopes, choosing the path of relatively open nation-states 
coupled with voluntary ethnic segregation. Given the decline of ethnically-selective 
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immigration criteria in many western countries by 1970 (Joppke 2005), and the high 
levels of immigration experienced since then, it is plausible to argue that dominant 
ethnicity has thereby been demoted in the public arena. 
In the 1990s, for example, the leading American immigration destinations 
were also the least attractive cities for the native-born. Los Angeles and New York 
City, for example, received between 1 and 1.5 million immigrants apiece during 
1990-1998, but simultaneously shed 1.5 to 2 million native-born Americans. (Frey 
and DeVol. 2000) Likewise, Amsterdam (pop. 740,000) became officially half 
nonwhite in 2005, a process driven by immigrants and their children settling in the 
city, but accentuated by the departure of 30,000 ethnic Dutch residents in the 1990s 
alone. (Alexander 2007: 165) This inverse relationship between international and 
domestic migration makes little economic sense because economic magnets should 
attract native and foreign-born workers alike. 
The rise of multiculturalism, in combination with 30-40 years of below-
replacement fertility among native white populations in Europe and North America, is 
powering a demographic revolution that will reduce the size of ethnic majorities in 
western countries. In the United States, the 'browning of America' will reduce the 
white racial category (alias the white pan-ethnic majority) to just 50 percent by 2050. 
(Kaufmann 2004b: 274) In Britain, similar dynamics will, on current trends, decrease 
the proportion of whites from the current 92 percent to just 75 percent by 2050, 
declining to as little as 30-40 percent by 2100. (Coleman 2005; Coleman 2006) Does 
this mean we will come full-circle, with dominant majorities declining to minority 
status through immigration and low native fertility?
Such an outcome seems unlikely. Indeed, projections in both the United States 
and Europe show considerable growth in the 'mixed-race' population, driven by 
soaring rates of interracial marriage. (Coleman 2005; Edmonston and Smith 1997) In 
addition, there is evidence for the 'whitening' postulate in that mixed-race individuals 
in Britain overwhelmingly prefer white marriage partners to those of other racial 
categories. (Voas 2006) When we consider the expansion of the definition of the 
dominant 'white' ethnic group in the United States in the period since the 1960s to 
encompass white Catholics and Jews (and even mixed-race Hispanics and Asians), it 
becomes conceivable that dominant ethnic groups can maintain their majority even in 
the face of massive immigration. Assimilation, minority desires for 'whitening' and 
pan-ethnic coalition, and, occasionally, boundary expansion, allows the dominant 
ethnie to adapt, counteracting demographic decline. The same could be said for 
Mexico's Mestizo dominant ethnie, which has successfully assimilated numerous 
indigenous people into its ranks since its ascent to dominance in 1917. (Brading 2001) 
All told, the modern shift from dominant minority to dominant majority ethnicity 
seems, like the nation-state, to be an indelible process which will continue into the 
foreseeable future.
Conclusion
This article takes the often overlooked phenomenon of dominant ethnicity as its 
subject matter. Our central argument is that there has been a long-running shift from 
dominant minority to dominant majority ethnicity which parallels the rise of the 
modern nation-state. This is driven by modern ideas of popular sovereignty and 
nationalism, which stress majority rule and the rule of 'like over like'. (Wimmer 1997: 
635) We begin by considering dominant minority ethnies (and sects) in postcolonial 
societies, focusing in particular on the cases of Syria, Rwanda and Iraq. We note that 
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politically dominant minorities in modern states: normally owe their dominant 
position to colonial legacies; rely on coercive policies while building a narrow 
societal support base; and attempt to forge links to wider national identities. The 
disjuncture between dominant ethnicity and national identity is especially pronounced 
in these societies - where the two narratives seem to run in parallel with little 'organic' 
connection between them. Democratisation and secession lead to the rise of dominant 
majorities (or pluralities) and the demise of dominant minorities. We find that there 
are few cases of dominant minorities remaining in the world, and these (i.e. Syria, 
Bahrain) are typically associated with authoritarian or imperfectly democratised 
regimes. Finally, we consider the vicissitudes of dominant ethnicity in the West. 
Strong ethnic majorities, often umbilically connected to 'their' nation-states, have 
recently come under pressure from liberal-multicultural norms and global migration. 
This has driven a wedge between dominant ethnies and 'their' increasingly inclusive 
states. In addition, the demographic preponderance of dominant majorities in the West 
is waning due to immigration and low native fertility. Though this raises the 
possibility of a return to the premodern condition of dominant minority ethnicity, we 
deem this an unlikely outcome given the propensity for many dominant ethnies to 
assimilate newcomers and forge pan-ethnic coalitions to retain numerical control.
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